County denies vulgar talk, allegations of fired employee
Published 9:46 am Wednesday, November 12, 2014
PENDLETON – Grant County has denied any wrongdoing in the firing of James N. Gravley, who claims he lost his job after complaining about lesbian name-calling in a hiring discussion.
Attorneys for the county, Karen Vickers and Blake H. Fry of the Portland firm Mersereau Shannon LLP, filed a response today in U.S. District Court in Pendleton to the federal lawsuit Gravley filed in September.
The defendants – the county, Community Corrections director Dean Hoodenpyl, County Judge Scott Myers and Clerk Brenda Percy – “made good faith efforts to comply with all applicable laws and policies and acted according to good faith beliefs,” the county response says.
The filing denies a litany of complaints outlined in Gravley’s lawsuit, filed by Portland attorney Matthew C. Ellis.
The county response claims the defendants are entitled to “qualified immunity,” that their acts were taken “for legitimate non-discriminatory reasons, and that they acted in good faith to comply with applicable laws and policies.
Gravley claims he was fired in retaliation for reporting the use of vulgar slang in a Dec. 9 meeting in which Community Corrections officials considered applicants for a job. He says a woman applicant was described as a dyke, a derogatory term for lesbian, and by another more offensive vulgarity.
Myers, in a later letter responding to the incident, has denied employees used the word “dyke” but his letter confirmed one employee had used a more vulgar term and then had apologized.
The response filed today denies the allegation of lesbian talk in the meeting, admitting only that one applicant was a woman “who had performed juvenile transports for the County and recently quit her job after an outburst of anger.”
The county response denies the phrases cited in Gravley’s complaint were used, but admits that Gravley complained Dec. 13 to Hoodenpyl later about language used in the meeting.
The defendants ask for judgment in their favor, costs and “any and all relief as the Court may deem proper.”